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ABSTRACT 
 
Social capital theory is exemplary in attempting to integrate both individual and institutional 
perspectives in the study of governance, but interactions between the individual and institutional 
components remain underexplored and unspecified in many situations.  We extend the theory from 
its focal attention on prisoners dilemma games to an important and understudied class of collective 
action problems of critical concern for governance— coordination tasks ranging from simple 
matching games to more complex tasks involving conflict (battle of the sexes) and assurance 
problems (stag hunt).  Laboratory experiments provide a means of observing the impact of 
institutional influences (bridging and bonding network capital), individual predispositions (trust and 
risk aversion), and their interaction on the ability to coordinate in these settings. The results confirm 
that neither individual nor institutional components alone can explain coordination, and that 
interactions between these components must be understood in terms of the specific task context 
being studied. 
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The basic idea of social capital is well known and widely accepted.  Cooperation evolves as 
individuals connected through overlapping networks of reciprocity develop common norms and 
mutual trust that allows them to resolve increasingly complex collective action problems (Coleman 
1988, Putnam 1993, 2000).   The theory has been expanded to include bridging as well as bonding 
relationships in extended networks that enhance different types of cooperation (Burt 2005, Berardo 
and Scholz 2010).  Recent extensions apply social capital concepts to the study of governance 
institutions that evolve to mitigate a broad array of institutional collective action problems facing 
government agencies and private organizations in public policy settings (Feiock and Scholz 2010).  
 Consensus on the basic idea breaks down in specific applications because of ambiguity in 
basic concepts and claims compounded by a limited range of systematic studies to test these claims 
in different contexts.  For example, to what extent do clustered relationships actually generate 
individual predispositions of trust and community norms that help coordinate policies within a 
policy community (Schnieder et al 2003), or alternatively to what extent do individual 
predispositions of policy actors create the clustered relationships in policy networks (Ahn and 
Scholz 2010)?  More specifically, do trust and bonding relationships generally enhance each other’s 
effectiveness in supporting cooperation, or are they substitutes that replace rather than reinforce 
each other (Yamagishi, Lubell et al 2010)?  What role do trust and bonding relationships play in the 
broad range of collective action problems better represented by coordination games that do not 
involve the inherent conflicts of social dilemmas?  Are bridging relationships more effective than 
bonding relationships in supporting coordination in policy networks (Berardo and Scholz 2010)?  
Does trust matter in these less conflictual settings, or do other individual predispositions like risk 
aversion play a more important role in affecting cooperation (Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon 2010)?   
 We investigate these questions in a laboratory setting in which subjects are randomly 
assigned to exchange positions representing bridging and bonding relationships and play 
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coordination games that represent different levels of conflict and assurance problems.  By measuring 
individual dispositions of trust and risk aversion, we test the impact of risk, trust, and institutional 
position on performance in three coordination games. 
 
Social Capital Integrates Individual Dispositions and Institutional Structure 
 Political science has developed sophisticated methods and models based on individual 
characteristics or on institutional setting, but is less equipped to analyze the broader category of 
interactions in which individual behavior is embedded within institutional settings that both shape 
and are shaped in complex ways by the population of individuals (cf Granovetter 1985).  Social 
capital theory provides one example of how the two primary units of analysis can be jointly analyzed 
to explain one of the central features of governance—sustaining cooperation and coordination in 
collective action problems.   
 
Triads Represent Institutional Settings  
The institutional setting in social capital theory refers to the full set of relationships among 
those facing the collective action dilemma in which individual preferences lead to suboptimal 
collective outcomes.  The positive role of clustered, overlapping networks of mutual reciprocity that 
we refer to generally as bonding relationships can be represented most simply in terms of the basic 
triadic relationships illustrated in Figure 1.  The letters within each box represent the individuals 
involved in the collective dilemmas, and the lines connecting letters indicate that a relationship exists 
between individuals.  For example, in our experiment the lines represent ongoing exchange 
relationships with choices and payoffs that correspond to iterated two-person coordination games.  
The closed triad on the left indicates that each individual plays with both others in the triad, while 
the open triad on the left indicates that D and F do not play each other, creating an open leg in the 
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triad. In the closed triad all players fill equivalent positions that we refer to as members, which 
emphasizes the bonding relationship represented by closed triads.  The open triad has two positions, 
and we refer to E as the leader and D and F as followers.   
 Following Coleman’s analysis (1988), Berardo and Scholz (2010) argue that the closed triad is 
more likely to sustain cooperative outcomes than the open triad for iterated prisoners dilemma 
games because if A defects against B, C could defect against A either to punish A or out of concern 
that A would defect against C next.  In the open triad, F could not retaliate against D, so D is not as 
constrained to maintain cooperation as A.   
Thus the difference between closed and open triads provides arguably the simplest 
representation of the advantages of clustered network relationships, or what Burt (2005) calls 
bonding capital.   Burt argues that bridging capital represented by the open triad is every bit as 
important for social capital as is bonding capital represented by the closed triad.  In the open triad, E 
functions as a conduit between D and F, allowing information and resources to flow between D and 
F without requiring them to have a direct contact.  In Burt’s terms, E fills a “structural hole” 
between unconnected players, and gains all the brokerage advantages that the position allows.  For 
coordination games involving no conflict, E can play a leadership role in selecting a mutually 
advantageous choice that both followers would readily accept.   
Of course, if the coordination task involves some alternatives more favorable to the leader 
than the followers, the brokerage position would presumably allow the leader to exploit their 
position and do better than the followers.  If leadership is important for achieving coordination, 
however, followers may still be better off than the members of the closed triads who have no 
structurally-induced leader and are less likely to gain any rewards from cooperation.  Berardo and 
Scholz (2010) develop this idea in the risk hypothesis; policy network actors in open triads perform 
better for simple coordination tasks, but actors in closed triads perform better as the risk of  
4 
 
exploitation by the leader increases.  Thus actors will seek open triad positions when risks are low, 
but will increasingly seek closed triads as risks increase.  In the experiments, we test this proposition 
by comparing the long-term coordination payoffs of members in the closed triad with the payoffs of 
leaders and followers in the open triads.  The risk hypothesis would predict that the relative 
performance of members would increase as the complexity and risk of exploitation increases.   
In addition to providing a clear representation of bridging and bonding structures, open and 
closed triads provide the basis for measuring both types of social capital.  Exponential random graph 
models compare the number of open and closed triads in an observed network with the number 
expected by chance in random networks containing the same number of actors and links;  significant 
positive coefficients for open triads indicates greater bonding capital, while significant positive 
coefficients for closed triads indicates greater bridging capital (Berardo and Scholz 2010).  Carpenter, 
Esterling and Lazer (2005) found that lobbyists tended to form more closed triads than expected, 
while Berardo and Scholz (2010) found no significant difference in the observed closed triads than 
would be expected by chance in estuary policy networks. The former study concluded that lobbyists 
formed closed triads to reduce the risk of defection when information was needed, while the latter 
concluded that estuary policy relationships imposed less risk of defection, and hence did not require 
this type of social capital.  In short, the ‘risk hypothesis’ implies that closed triads offer the best 
support for cooperation when the risk of defection is high, while open triads offer the best support 
for coordination when risk is low.  By using closed and open triads as the basis for testing this 
hypothesis, experimental results can be directly translated into comparable tests using observed data 
from more complex field settings.   
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Trust and Risk Aversion Represent Individual Predispositions 
 Trust is generally considered to be the most critical individual component of social capital, 
and has been investigated in many contexts (Hardin 2006).  The basic idea is simple.  If player E 
trusts player D to reciprocate cooperation and not to defect in Figure 1, player E is more likely to 
cooperate with D despite the lack of institutional social capital in the open triad. We consider trust 
to be a behavioral propensity that increases the probability of choosing cooperative alternatives in 
relevant situations.  Trust can only support cooperation when trusting individuals are paired with 
trustworthy individuals who reciprocate trust, at least to the extent that trust is conditional and is 
diminished in response to defections.  Since behavioral measures of trust have been found to be as 
accurate in predicting trustworthiness as trust, (Glaeser et al 2003) any matched high trust players 
would be expected to cooperate at higher levels that any matched low-trust players or mismatched 
players.  In short, the impact on cooperation is determined by the interaction of the trust of ego (the 
player of concern) and of the trust environment that in our case includes the trust of all alters (ego’s 
game partners). 
Social capital theory is clear that trust is more likely to develop in closed rather than open 
relationships (Ostrom and Ahn 2000), but the theory is more ambiguous about the relative impact 
of trust in each of the two triad settings.  Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe (1998) argue that generalized 
trust is a substitute for closed relationships, so either trust or closed triads alone are sufficient to 
support cooperation. This implies that the combined impact of trust and closed triads will be less 
than the sum of independent impacts.  The interaction between individual predispositions and 
institutional positions can be used to test this proposition (Whiteman 2010).4
                                                            
4 In prisoners dilemma experiments measuring cooperation the author found that structure alone did not 
predict cooperation.  Instead, structure’s effect was conditional on the trust dispositions of the subjects and 
their partners.  Results show that network closure reinforced cooperative behavior only among high trusters.  
Conversely, among low trusters closure hampered cooperation and performance improved for low trusters in 
open network structures (Whiteman 2010).  
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Since our inquiry focuses on coordination games rather than on cooperative dilemmas, there 
is little reason to believe that trust should play a role in simple coordination games that do not 
involve any risk of defection.  Institutional position rather than individual characteristics would 
appear to be most important here.  However, trust and the trust environment are more likely to 
affect results when coordination tasks become more complex, and particularly when conflicting 
incentives hamper attempts to coordinate, as in the battle of sexes game discussed below.   
For other coordination games, risk aversion provides a more salient behavioral 
predisposition when coordination involves a choice between safe alternatives guaranteeing some 
minimum payoff and higher paying alternatives that would pay nothing unless everyone chose the 
same riskier alternative (Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon 2010).  In this case, risk-averse individuals will 
have a greater tendency to choose the lower-paying safe alternative, while risk-seeking individuals 
will seek the higher-paying but risky alternative.  Thus paired risk-seeking individuals are most likely 
to coordinate on the highest payoff, paired risk-averse individuals on the safe but lower payoff, and 
mismatched pairs are likely to earn the least because of the difficulty in coordinating on any one 
choice, as will be discussed further in the stag hunt game below.  As with trust, the interaction 
between risk and the risk environment are expected to play an increasingly important role as the 
coordination task becomes more complex and risky.  
In sum, trust and risk aversion appear likely to enhance social capital in coordination games 
involving conflict and risk respectively. Yet their mutual role across a spectrum of games has not 
been systematically investigated empirically or theoretically.  Nor has their general relationship with 
open and closed triads been explored, although some specific relationships will be discussed in the 
context of the specific cooperative games described next.  
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Coordination Problems and Social Capital 
We extend this analysis of individual and institutional social capital to collective action 
problems in which players can all be better off if they coordinate their decisions, but different types 
of problems make coordination difficult.  The coordination tasks we consider range from simple 
matching games to more complex tasks involving conflict (battle of the sexes) and assurance 
problems (stag hunt).   Given the complexity of interactions between individual and institutional 
factors outlined above, we limit the experiment to two-person games played in the triads illustrated 
in Figure 1.  Figure 2 illustrates the payoffs that define each coordination game using the actual 
payoffs and format that was presented to subjects in the experiment.  Players seek the highest 
payoffs from coordination in an iterated game in which they know only the choice of all others in 
their triad for up to four previous periods.  
 
Matching 
The matching game provides a simple coordination task in which each of the two players 
receives a payoff of 50 if they select the same color and a payoff of zero if they pick different colors.  
Both players have every incentive to choose the same color as the other player, and once a common 
color is selected, neither player has any incentive to change their choice.  In this situation, social 
capital could consist of any common norms and predispositions that would determine a “focal 
point” allowing both players to make the same choice (Schelling 1978).  A pretty color may be 
selected over an ugly one, for example, or a convention generally favoring the first choice in the list 
could also produce coordination even in the first period of play.  
 The experiment attempts to eliminate these sources of social capital by informing subjects 
and presenting the payoffs to each subject with an array of similarly vivid colors and different 
orderings.  In an iterated game with no communication and no natural focal point, the first period 
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choice is therefore arbitrary.  In following periods the challenge is to coordinate as soon as possible 
on either one of the partners’ initial choices. 
 The risk hypothesis argues that open triads have an advantage over closed triads because the 
leader’s choice can provide a focal point for both followers, who can simply choose the leader’s first 
period color in the second period.  Members in the closed triad have no such focal point, and are 
therefore more likely to go through cycles in which either both or neither partner switches to the 
other’s color.   
 Although there is no risk of defection in this game, trust may affect the number of periods 
required to coordinate to the extent that high trust is associated with a tendency to reciprocate, and 
reciprocity in this case would lead to a greater tendency to switch to the partner’s color.  If so, then 
two high trust subjects will have greater difficulty coordinating than a mixed pairing of high and low 
trust subjects, since opposing tendencies would lead to coordination on the color first chosen by the 
low trust subject.  This hypothesis suggests that neither ego’s nor alter’s trust alone would improve 
coordination, but the interaction term would have a significant negative effect. 
 
Battle of the Sexes 
 The battle of the sexes game adds conflict to the simple coordination task, as indicated by 
the payoffs in Figure 2b.  The name of the game reflects the dilemma facing a couple who differ in 
whether to go to a movie or sporting event, but who would much prefer doing either together over 
going to the preferred event alone.  The same problem is ubiquitous in coordination settings where 
all players are better off with a coordinated choice, but each would prefer a different option.  
As in the matching game, both partners want to avoid selecting different colors and 
receiving a zero payoff, but they are now in conflict about whether to select green or blue.  In the 
first payoff diagram to the left, the subject gets the higher payoff of 75 and the partner gets the 
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lower payoff of 50 if both choose green.  The payoffs are reversed if both choose blue, with the 
subject getting only 50 and the partner getting 75.  Diagram 2 to the right reverses the advantage in 
the game with the second player for members and leaders, to emphasize to subjects that a different 
choice needs to be considered in the two games.5  
 As in the simple matching setting, the brokerage power of the leader in the open triad 
provides a potential advantage in avoiding mismatched color choices. A leader could choose the 
highest payoff with one follower and the lowest payoff with the other in each round, and reverse the 
ordering in the next round.  If followers responded appropriately, all would receive a sequence of 
higher and lower payoffs, ensuring the highest average payoffs for leaders and followers alike.  To 
the extent that trust reflects a predisposition to seek an equitable outcome, high trust for leaders and 
followers could increase the likelihood of establishing this equitable equilibrium. 
On the other hand, a low trust or risk-seeking leader could use the brokerage power to insist 
on receiving the highest payoffs with each partner, while a risk-averse leader might settle for the 
lowest payoffs.  Particularly in the former case, risk-seeking followers are likely to reduce the success 
of the leader’s strategy and induce low coordination scores.   In short, the introduction of conflict 
appears likely to reduce the potential advantage of the open triad, and is likely to enhance the 
importance of ego’ trust and risk as well as the trust and risk environments.  
 
Stag Hunt 
 The stag hunt game is named after the coordination problem imposed by hunting for stags 
rather than rabbits.  If everyone chooses to hunt for the stag cooperatively, the chances of a 
                                                            
5  This mixing of colors inadvertently increased the ease of achieving an equilibrium in the closed triad, where 
the choice of a single color for each member would give the highest payoff to the subject in one game and to 
the other player in the other game, allowing each player in the triad to select a single color in order to receive 
both the highest and lowest equilibria, which provides a stable equilibrium with the highest average payoff in 
the iterated game that is not available in the open triad.  
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successful hunt and hence a high payoff are good.  However, if some of the hunters decide to hunt 
for rabbits in neglect of their duties to the stag hunt, they are assured of a safer but smaller payoff, 
while those who stick with the stag hunt are likely to fail and receive nothing.  Here the problem is 
not of conflicting incentives, but rather of assurances needed before one is willing to commit to the 
riskier high-payoff option.  This tradeoff is reflected in many policy settings where potential 
collaborators must choose between easier, lower payoff projects that are less dependent on others 
and more productive high payoff projects that are dependent on commitments from others. 
 Figure 2c provides the two-person equivalent to the stag hunt, where silver represents the 
risky high payoff alternative and brick represents the safer but lower payoff alternative.  As noted 
previously, matched risk-seeking partners are most likely to coordinate at the highest payoff, while 
risk-averse partners may successfully coordinate on the lower payoff equilibrium and mismatched 
partners will have the greatest difficulty in coordinating.  Thus the matched low-risk partners and the 
mismatched partners have the greatest potential for improved coordination through a risk-seeking 
leader, particularly when risk averse or trusting followers are willing to copy the leader’s choice.  
 To restate the obvious, conjectures in each of the games are based not on an integrated 
theoretical foundation but rather on extensions of the basic but underdeveloped arguments in social 
capital theory.  They function less as testable hypotheses than as rebuttable assertions used to design 
the experiment and analytic approach intended to explore the impact of trust, risk and position on 
coordination games.  
 
Initial Results: Performance in Open and Closed Triads Depends on the Game 
Figure 3 compares coordination in open and closed triads in terms of the average payoffs 
per round in each of the three games. The vertical axis in each graph gives the average payoff in 
ECU units—note that the scales differ in each game due to the different range of average payoffs.  
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The horizontal axis indicates periods separately for players in open and closed triads. .  Separate lines 
report results for subjects who played in the open and closed triads first.  The stag hunt game 
indicates the reset after period eight by the break in the line.  
The two graphs for matching (3a) and stag hunt(3c) both show that average payoffs increase 
in every round, suggesting that players tend to lock into a coordination equilibrium that maintains 
the same payoffs in succeeding rounds.  As non-equilibrium pairs reach an equilibrium, the lower 
payoffs are reduced in each round.  The clearest example is in the matching game (graph 1), where 
there is never a reason to abandon an equilibrium color choice once achieved. All open triads that 
first played in closed triads (green upper line in left graph of Figure 3a) manage to reach equilibrium 
by period four, earning the maximum payoff of 50 ECUs in the last two rounds.   
The matching game in Figure 3a provides the strongest evidence that open triads are 
generally better for coordination, where average payoffs in all periods after the first are higher in the 
open than in the closed triads.  Averaged over all periods in both rounds the average payoff of 38 in 
the open is significantly greater than 32 in the closed triads, with both payoffs indicating that full 
coordination is achieved in more than half the periods.  The left-hand side of Figure 3a shows that 
open triads also score higher in each period when played after a first round in closed triads.  
Although the difference is not significant, it raises the possibility of a learning process in the open 
triad that is not evident in the closed.   Overall, the initial matching results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that the leader in open triads can provide a focal point for coordination that is not 
available in closed triads. 
The battle of the sexes game in Figure 3b shows no clear effect of structure.  In both 
conditions a drop in payoffs occurs after the very first encounter with the game (the first period 
played when that condition was played first), after which improved coordination brings increasing 
payoffs in succeeding rounds.  However, the overall average payoff of 44 in both open and closed 
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triads and the highest average payoffs around 55 in the later periods fall short of the highest possible 
average payoff of 67.5.  The pattern of payoffs provide little evidence of learning from the first 
round to the second; in fact, payoffs in the initial period of the second round actually drop for open 
and closed triads, and payoffs remain lower in every period for open triads during the second round.    
The stag hunt game in Figure 3c does not support the superiority of open triads for 
coordination, since average payoffs over all periods and rounds for closed triads (73) is slightly 
greater than average payoffs for open (72).  Figure 3a indicates that the higher average payoff 
reflects the higher payoffs for closed in the earliest and latest periods of each restart of play, 
suggesting perhaps that leaders introduce greater instability rather than leadership in stag hunt 
settings.  We later clarify that trusting leaders in particular depress the earnings of trusting followers. 
In sum, the simple risk hypothesis that leaders in open triads enhance coordination is 
supported for the matching game, but the battle of sexes and stag hunt games are inconclusive. 
 
Analyzing the Impact of Risk, Trust, and Position on Coordination 
Our central conjecture is that the response of ego in each position will be influenced by the 
predispositions of both ego and ego’s partners.  To test this conjecture we use maximum likelihood 
estimation of the effects on the coordination outcomes of risk and trust dispositions of both ego 
and alter in each of the structural positions.  
 
Modeling Coordination 
We estimate the same model in separate regressions for each game, with added controls in 
the longer stag hunt game to account for each repeated round. The dependent variable is coordination 
at the individual level in each period.  Since payoffs differ across games, we use a uniform 
categorical ranking from worst to best outcomes for the subject on a scale from zero to three across 
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all games in order to facilitate comparison.  In the matching game if subjects chose the same color 
coordination is coded as a three, if they chose different colors it is coded as zero.6  In the stag hunt 
game both ego and alter receive a coordination score of 3 if they chose silver and each receives 75 
ECUs .  The (50, 50) payoff earns ego a score of 2, (50, 0) a score of 1 and (0, 50) a score of 0.  
Coordination coding in the battle of the sexes again reflects the self-interested preference ordering 
of the subject; (0,0) earns ego a score of 0, (50, 75) a score of 2 and (75, 50) a score of 3.   For 
members and leaders, ego’s coordination is averaged over both alters, producing up to six ordered 
categories that range from zero to three.   
 Position:  Position in the open or closed triad is represented by three dummy variables, 
member, leader and follower, for each of the positions labeled in Figure1.  Member indicates an ego in 
the closed network.  Leader equals one when ego is in position A of the open network and follower 
indicates egos in the periphery positions B and C of the open network.  Follower is used as the 
omitted reference category for all estimations. 
 Trust: The trust questions in the pre-survey include three self reported trusting behaviors 
that have proved effective in predicting trust-related behavior in experiments (Glaeser & Soutter 
2000, Orbell & Dawes 1991), including “How often do you lend CDs, DVDs or money to friends?” 
and “Have you ever benefited from the honesty of others?” Three questions from the General 
Social Survey that measure trust attitudes (Gachter 2003, Holm and Danielson 2005) were also 
included in the questionnaire, but our previous study of open and closed triads in the prisoners 
dilemma game (Whiteman 2010) has confirmed that the behavioral trust questions are better 
predictors of cooperative behavior than the attitudinal measures.7   The trust variable is the 
                                                            
6 Since our analysis of coordination was done within games only the matching code was essentially 
dichotomous.  However we kept the full range of values in order to uniformly model coordination over all 
games. 
7 In previous estimations we have found that despite its wide spread use, attitudinal trust is a poor predictor 
of trusting behavior in the laboratory setting.  Self –reported trusting behaviors are not only better predictors 
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dimension that loaded most heavily on the three trust behavior questions in the principal 
component analysis of the trust questions, recoded to a scale from 0 to 1 with 1 being the most 
trusting and 0 being the least. 
 Risk: The risk questions on the pre-survey include a standard lottery question used in 
experimental economics to measure risk aversion (Ivanova-Stenzel and Salmon 2010) and a risk 
aversion measure developed by Ehrlich and Maestas (2010) to reflect the subject’s comfort level 
when making risky decisions.  In addition, the first choice in the battle of sexes and stag hunt games 
provide observations of the subject’s propensity to select the lower or higher payoff outcome in 
each game. Subjects choosing the “safe” choice guaranteeing a payoff of 50 in the stag hunt game 
are clearly more risk averse than those choosing the possibility of receiving either 75 or zero.  
Similarly, subjects willing to accept the lower payoff in the battle of the sexes appear to be more risk 
averse than those seeking the higher payoff; the lower payoff is safer in the sense that the partner is 
more likely to accept this choice and hence avoid the zero payoff that would occur if both partners 
insist on getting the higher payoff.  
 Our initial plan to create a combined risk aversion scale was abandoned when the pre-survey 
measures proved to be poor predictors of the first period choices in both games and the four 
measures had surprisingly low correlations. Although the first choice in stag hunt more closely 
reflects the lottery question in theory, the highest correlation (.28) among all four variables was 
between the battle of the sexes first choice and the lottery question.  The lower correlation of the 
stag hunt choice likely reflected the fact that only one in ten subjects chose the lower paying option 
in that game, whereas about half of the subjects chose the lower paying option in battle of the sexes.  
The more even split in the battle of sexes choice appears to better reflect the discrimination among 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
but robust to alternative specifications.  We conducted identical tests to our previous analyses and found that 
like our previous findings, after principle components analysis two significant components emerge; one 
loading primarily with the GSS questions and another loading primarily with the behavior questions.   
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subjects provided by the lottery question.  As a result, we decided to use the first period choice from 
the battle of the sexes as the best measure of ego’s behavioral disposition to risk aversion.  Because 
leaders and members make two choices in this first period, the two first-period choices are averaged 
so .5 indicates an ego that chose the risky alternative with one partner and risk-averse alternative 
with the other.  Risk is coded as increasing risk aversion, with 0 indicating a risk seeking ego and 1 
indicating a risk averse ego.   
 Trust, Risk and Position: We expect that predispositions will lead to different behaviors 
depending on ego’s position in the triad, so we interact trust and risk with member and leader to 
compare the impact of each predisposition across positions.  We use follower as the base category in 
the model, since followers are most distinct in having only one game to play.  The coefficient for 
trust and risk therefore estimate the variables’ impacts for followers, and the coefficient for the 
interaction variables estimate the difference in impact on followers versus the position that is 
interacted with each variable. 
Trust and Risk Environment: A key element of our approach incorporates the effects of 
alters’ dispositions on ego’s behavior and on coordination outcomes. The average trust level or risk 
aversion that ego comes in contact with defines ego’s trust or risk environment for the game. Alter 
risk aversion and alter trust measure the average risk aversion and trust values for ego’s current 
partners.  Since ego and alters respond to each others’ dispositions, we interact both ego and alter 
risk aversion and ego and alter trust to measure the combined effects of the risk and trust 
environments respectively.   
Experimental Controls: We represent several elements of the experimental design in the 
model to control for subject backgrounds and ordering effects.  Controls for subject background 
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include age8 and dummy variables male and experts, a variable to distinguish subjects in the session 
that recruited students and faculty with knowledge of game theory.  Controls for ordering effects 
include closed first to distinguish subjects who played each game first in the closed triad from the 
(omitted) baseline category that played each game first in the open triad.  Similarly, Match First 
distinguishes subjects who were first assigned to the matching game and Stag Hunt First distinguishes 
subjects first assigned to the stag hunt game from the (omitted) baseline category that played battle 
of sexes first. 
 Estimation Procedure: The nature of the experimental data lends itself well to a nonlinear 
panel estimation of coordination.    Each of the 99 subjects has repeated interactions over ten 
periods in the combined matching games, 20 periods in the combined battle of sexes game, and 32 
periods in the combined stag hunt games.  The subject and not the game provides the unit of 
analysis, so alter and coordination variables and are averaged when subjects are playing in two 
games.  Since we observe many individuals over many periods and since the dependent variable is 
measured in up to six ordered categories, we use a random effects ordered probit model (Fréchette 
2001) for estimating the effect of position, risk and trust on coordination.   Random effects 
estimation, as opposed to fixed effects estimation, is necessary because important variables like trust 
and risk do not vary at the individual level.9   
 Table 1 presents the results of the three random effects ordered probit models, one for each 
coordination game, in the three labeled columns.  Estimated coefficients for the row variable are 
                                                            
8 Normally age is a non-issue since most undergraduates fall within a 5 year age range, but for this analysis age 
controls were added because our “Expert Sample” session consisted of graduate students and faculty 
members.  In general laboratory settings age icreases coordination (Heinneman et al 2004), and giving in 
ultimatum (Guth, Schmidt and Sutter 2003) and dictator games (Bosch-Domenech et al. 2007). 
9 Random effects models treat the individual-specific effect as a random variable.  From the initial data 
analysis, the within and between variances in all game are different.  Because of this difference the use of a 
fixed effects model would eliminate one or more key explanatory variables. With the use of long panels this 
problem is very common (Cameron and Trivedi 2008) and random effects are necessary. 
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reported in the cells with standard errors in parentheses, and model statistics are provided in the last 
rows of the table.10   
The interactions are easier to understand in terms of the combined effects on payoffs as 
presented in the graphs in Figure 4.  The left column of graphs illustrates the effect of trust terms 
for each game model, while the right illustrates the effect of risk.  Each line in the graphs represents 
the predicted coordination (vertical axis) for ego as ego’s trust or risk changes from zero to one 
(horizontal axis) for the specific category of players represented by the line.  Members (red), leaders 
(blue), and followers (green) are each represented by colored lines.  For each position or color, solid 
lines represent outcomes in an environment of low-valued alters, while dotted lines represent high-
valued alters.  Thus the graphs illustrate the full pattern of interactions between position and the 
trust and risk dispositions of both ego and alters, controlling for the other variables in the model.  
Since the predicted values are calculated using the actual value for all variables in the model for a 
given fitted observation, lines on the trust graph end with the lowest and highest value of ego’s trust 
observed for each category represented.11  Several significant control variables in Table 1 provide 
useful background information for the discussion of results.  Playing the stag hunt game first 
significantly suppressed scores in the other games; this game turned out to be the easiest to 
coordinate and hence the highest-scoring, which perhaps set unduly high expectations for the 
ensuing games. Furthermore, each of the succeeding three rounds in the stag hunt produced 
increasingly higher levels of coordination that were all significantly higher than the first. Experts 
with knowledge of game theory did significantly better than others in the stag hunt game, where the 
high-scoring equilibrium is evident and attainable, but worse in the battle of the sexes game, where 
                                                            
10 Rho values indicate the proportion of variance explained by the panel-level variance.  A rho of zero means 
that most of the variation is within subjects and not between them making a random effects estimation 
inappropriate.  All of our model rhos are non-zero and significant indicating that the variability between 
subjects is greater than within subjects, thus the random effect α is significant.   
11 Graphs were created in Stata by calculating fitted values (default xb) with “predict y” after each regression 
and graphing the predictions using the “graph twoway lfit y…” command.   
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optimal equilibria are less clear and negotiation through threatening countermoves might prove to 
be counterproductive.  Males did better in the stag hunt even controlling for their potentially more 
risk-seeking behavior, and older students did somewhat worse in the battle of the sexes. 
 
Results: Matching  
The Matching game provides the simplest test of coordination, and as expected the matching 
model in Table 1 produces the simplest interactions between position, trust, and risk.  Although 
open triads score better than closed triads in the direct comparison, the coefficients in Table 1 
indicate that leaders and followers in open triads have no significant advantage over members in 
closed triads once we control for differences in trust and risk.  In particular, the significant negative 
interaction between member and trust indicates that the most important difference in performance 
between open and closed triads is due to the poor coordination achieved by high-trust members of 
closed triads. In Figure 4.1.a, this is reflected in the increasing distance between the red lines 
representing members and the other colored lines—the distance is greatest with high-trust alters 
(dotted lines), although the alter effects are not significant in the model.   
It is ironic that trust, the predisposition expected to support cooperative outcomes in 
prisoners’ dilemmas, becomes a liability for closed triads in simple matching games. Egos with low 
values of trust do about equally well in all positions.  We speculate that high trusters are those most 
likely to switch colors in the next period when partners have not yet coordinated on a color.  High 
trust followers paired with low-trust leaders are therefore more likely to switch to the leader’s color 
and the low-trust leader is more likely not to switch, increasing the likelihood of coordination.  This 
explanation is consistent with the positive (although not significant) slope of the top line for 
followers facing low-trust alters in Figure 4.1.a, particularly for high-trust followers who coordinate 
at the highest levels.  When these same high trust players are members of a closed triad with no 
19 
 
natural leader, the same propensity to change presumably increases the problem of cycling in which 
both players adopt the other’s previous choice, leading to the lowest coordination outcomes.   
Risk predispositions that are generally thought to be more relevant to coordination games, 
on the other hand, play no significant role in the matching model.  The generally negative slopes for 
risk aversion in Figure 4.1.b are not associated with significant coefficients, and the lower outcomes 
for members compared with leaders and followers appears to be about the same for high and low 
risk alters and all levels of ego’s risk aversion. In sum, structure is important in the matching game, 
but primarily because high trust egos have significantly more coordination problems in closed triads 
than in open ones.   
 
Results: Battle of the Sexes  
The Battle of the Sexes game introduces a level of conflict to the task of coordination that 
produces the expectedly complex pattern of significant interaction effects in Table 1. First, the 
negative coefficients for position variables indicate that followers coordinate at the highest levels, 
and the coefficient for leaders indicates a significant difference between leaders and followers.  
Several exit interviews suggested a likely explanation: since leaders play two games to followers’ one 
game per period, they have twice as many earning possibilities.  A norm of fairness would suggest 
therefore that leaders should accept the lower payoff in each game and allow each follower to get 
the highest payoff.  Leaders still earn more per period (2x50=100 vs. 75 for each follower), but 
selecting the lower payoff results in the lower coordination category per game that is reflected in the 
negative coefficient for leaders.  In any case, the redistribution from leader to follower does not 
provide higher average payoffs in open than in closed triads, since both earn the same on average as 
reported previously. 
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Second, all but one trust variable is significant, indicating that the effects of trust depend on 
both position and on the trust environment.  Only the interaction member x trust is not significant, 
indicating that members share with the base category of followers the same strong negative effect of 
trust.  Leaders are significantly different, with trust having a slightly less negative effect.  Both terms 
of the trust environment are significant, with alter’s trust also having a negative effect on 
coordination but the combined ego and alter trust having a larger positive impact.  The result is 
most readily seen in Figure 4.2.a, where coordination generally decreases with trust for low-trust 
environments (negative slope of solid lines) but actually increases with trust for high-trust 
environments (positive slope of dotted lines).  In other words, coordination increases with the 
similarity of ego and alter’s trust.  Low trust egos paired with low trust alters score highest for all but 
the leadership position, while high trust egos always do their best when paired with other high trust 
alters.   
To the extent that trust encourages reciprocity, as suggested earlier, the results are consistent 
with a greater willingness of high trusters to choose the lower payoff first in the expectation of 
receiving the higher payoff in the next period, which would result in both players receiving the 
highest possible average payoff in a sequence of plays.  While the high trust strategy may work when 
matched to another high truster, it would also lead to lower payoffs when mismatched with low 
trusters more inclined to take the higher payoff in every round.  This does not explain why low 
trusters paired together do better than high trusters paired together, except to suggest the difficulty 
in developing and sustaining the high mutual payoff equilibrium of alternatively sharing the highest 
and lowest payoffs. 
Third, both of the position interactions with risk are significant, but the risk environment is 
not.  Both members and leaders are adversely affected by increasing risk aversion in comparison to 
followers, the baseline category that shows no significant affect related to risk.  As with trust, the 
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risk environment indicates that egos do better when matched with alters of similar risk aversion, but 
in this case the alter interactions are not significant.  Thus the negative impact of risk aversion on 
members and leaders is the dominant factor for risk, as indicated by the downward-sloping solid and 
dotted lines for all but followers in Figure 4.2.b.  Since risk aversion is measured by the selection of 
the lower payoff coordination equilibrium, the predisposition that leads to this choice (controlling 
for trust) appears most harmful for members and leaders.  Followers are less affected by risk 
aversion, presumably because of the fairness norm that strongly favors them in relation to leaders.   
In sum, leaders do worse than followers and members in the battle of the sexes game, most 
likely because of the fairness norm that adversely affects only leaders. All positions do better when 
paired with alters sharing similar levels of trust, particularly when both have low trust.  This may 
reflect a predisposition among high trusters to seek reciprocation by initially selecting the low payoff 
outcome.  Finally, members and leaders do worse with higher risk aversion, although followers are 
less affected. 
 
Results: Stag Hunt Game  
The stag hunt game has no conflicting motives among players, but requires assurance that 
other players will choose the highest coordinated payoff rather than the safest choice.  Table 1 
reports significant interactions with both the trust and risk environments, but no significant 
interactions with position.  Although the coefficients in Table 1 suggest that leaders do better than 
followers and members in average payoffs controlling for trust and risk, the differences in this case 
are not significant.   
As expected in more complex coordination tasks, trust and risk environments appear to play 
the dominant role in stag hunt, with position having little influence.  The positive coefficients of 
trust and alter trust are balanced in this case by a large negative interaction coefficient between ego 
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and alter, so ego and alter that are on opposite ends of the trust scale coordinate more successfully 
than those who are similar.  In Figure 4.3.a, this can be seen in the positive slopes for low-trust alters 
which indicates that higher trust egos score higher when paired with low-trust alters, regardless of 
the subject’s position in the triad.  Similarly, the primarily negative slopes for high trust alters 
indicate that lower trust egos do better when paired with this group. In short, being paired with 
alters having similar levels of trust helps coordination in the battle of the sexes game, but actually 
harms coordination in the stag hunt game.   
The interactions with risk, on the other hand, suggest that similarity in risk aversion does 
enhance coordination, particularly among members.  Unlike in Figure 4.3.a, the dotted lines 
representing the risk averse alter environment have positive slopes, while the line representing the 
risk seeking alter environment (solid) has a negative slope for members, and a steeper positive slope 
than for the risk averse environment for leaders and followers.   For leaders and followers, risk 
aversion has a positive impact even with risk seeking alters.  In short, increases in risk aversion will 
increase ego’s rewards of coordination in all positions except for members facing risk seeking alters, 
but ego will still do better when paired with a similar alter. 
 
Implications for Leaders, Followers and Members 
In general, the graphs in Figure 4 suggest that it is best to avoid being a member in matching 
situations, a leader in battle of the sexes situation, and a follower in stag hunt situations.  In addition, 
leaders, followers and members appear to require different strategies to coordinate when conflict 
and assurance problems are added to the basic matching problem of coordination.  Cells in Table 2 
report the trust and risk strategies suggested by models for the indicated row position when 
confronting the column game.  The table is intended primarily as overview of the results, and comes 
with a strong proviso that not all prescriptions are supported by significance tests and even when 
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well supported no single experiment can establish the generalizability of results to broader settings.  
Furthermore, the link between predispositions and the actual decision strategies they are associated 
with are not well established, so the theoretical foundations are very weak for most suggestions.   
Leaders, for example, do best in Table 2 by reigning in their natural trust propensity in 
simple matching settings, but by increasing their trust in both of the more complex coordination 
settings.  When alters can be selected, leaders should seek low trust followers in matching games, but 
seek followers with trust similar to their own when conflict of interest is a factor (battle of the sexes) 
and seek alters opposite their trust predisposition when assurance is most required (stag hunt).   
Followers, on the other hand, need to respond primarily to the leader’s trust.  They do best 
by shifting their trust in the opposite direction from the leader for simple matching or assurance 
settings, but shifting toward the leader for the more conflictual setting of battle of the sexes. 
Consequently, a follower’s selection strategy for leaders is the same as the leader’s strategy for 
selecting followers. 
Members, like leaders, do best by reducing trust and seeking low trust members for simple 
matching settings.  In the more complex games, their best strategy is the same as followers, 
emphasizing similarity for conflict situations and dissimilarity for assurance situations.  
Risk aversion requires a slightly different pattern.  Leaders in this case do best by increasing 
their natural risk aversion for simple matching and assurance settings, but by seeking greater risk in 
conflict situations.  Followers, unlike leaders, do best by seeking greater risk in simple matching 
settings and by moving toward the leader in conflictual settings.  However, like leaders, they do best 
by increasing risk aversion when assurance becomes most critical.  Members, like followers, reduce 
risk aversion in matching settings.  However they also reduce aversion in conflictual settings like 
leaders do, but move opposite their alters for stag hunt and assurance settings. 
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Conclusion 
Our experimental investigation supports the contention that position, risk and trust play 
complex and interactive roles in coping with coordination problems, although the results raise more 
issues than they resolve for the theory of social capital.  As expected, the leadership structure in 
open triads improves outcomes for leaders and followers alike in simple coordination tasks like the 
matching game. However, leadership plays this positive role primarily to overcome the problems of 
coordination among high trust subjects.  Trust may provide critical support for cooperation in social 
dilemmas, but the experiment indicates that low trust leaders and members are better able to resolve 
simple coordination problems.  Furthermore, the role of risk, trust, and the risk and trust 
environments changes dramatically with the type of game as well as with the position of the subject.   
Trust plays an unexpectedly large role in explaining cooperative outcomes in all coordination 
games.  When conflict confounds the problem of coordination, as in the battle of the sexes game, 
trusting leaders do better for themselves than non-trusting leaders, unlike in the simpler matching 
game.  However, trusting leaders appear to do better in the experiment primarily by allowing 
followers to exploit them.  “Transparency” in the open triad makes it clear to followers that leaders 
can earn twice what followers can, and a trusting leader willing to share this advantage by accepting 
the lower-scoring equilibrium appears to do better than a more confrontational leader in this setting.   
For followers and members, on the other hand, the level of trust is less important than being paired 
with an alter having a similar level of trust.  Matched high and low trust pairs do better than 
mismatched pairs.  Matched high trust subjects are likely to overcome conflicting coordination 
choices for the same reasons they can overcome conflicting cooperation choices in prisoners 
dilemma games.  But why can matched low trust subjects overcome the same conflicting 
coordination choices and actually outscore matched high trust subjects?  What strategy related to a 
low trust behavioral predisposition can explain this enhanced performance?  
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More trusting leaders do better in both of the more complex coordination game.  However, 
when assurance rather than conflict poses a challenge to coordination, as in the stag hunt game, 
mismatched pairs in all positions outperform matched pairs with similar levels of trust.  It is not 
particularly surprising that conflict and assurance problems might require such opposite strategies, 
but a clear explanation of why these strategies work in each setting is also needed. 
The role of risk aversion in coordination games is more widely recognized than is the role of 
trust, but here again experimental results suggest a more complex role than current theories can 
explain.  The theoretical expectations that greater risk aversion and closed triads would both 
decrease payoffs in the stag hunt game are only partly confirmed.   Greater risk aversion increases 
payoffs for all but one condition in Figure 4.3.b, but closed triads earn higher average payoffs than 
do open triads. On the other hand, greater risk seeking increases payoffs for all but one condition in 
the battle of sexes game in Figure 4.2.b, and slightly enhances payoffs for all conditions in the simple 
matching game. 
The experimental results provide both empirical and theoretical challenges for social capital 
theory.  Empirically, the complex results from our broad-brush experiment need to be retested in 
more narrowly-designed experiments with manipulations to probe specific relationships for each 
game.  For example, would payoffs more favorable to the safe choice make risk aversion more 
important than trust in the stag hunt game, or would different representations of leadership and 
transparency alter the role of leaders in the matching game.  Theoretically, the biggest challenge is to 
link predispositions to specific strategies that explain observed relationships.  This would require 
both a better understanding of learning strategies in iterated coordination games and better tools to 
identify such strategies in empirical data.  We hope that the experimental results reported here 
demonstrate the importance of considering important collective action settings beyond those 
associated with the prisoner’s dilemma, the need to analyze interactions between institutional 
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structures and individual traits of the population in each collective action setting, and the utility of 
experimental methods to do so.   
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Figure 1: Social Capital and Positions in Closed and Open Triads 
 
 
 
     
   Closed Triad                              Open Triad 
  
 
Positions within Triad Structures: 
Member = Positions A, B and C in Closed Triad 
Leader = Position E in Open Triad 
Follower = Positions D and F in Open Triad 
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Figure 2: Matching, Battle of the Sexes, and Stag Hunt Coordination Problems 
 
 
 
a. Matching 
 
b. Battle of the Sexes 
 
c. Stag Hunt 
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Figure 3: Average Payoffs per Period in Coordination Games 
 
a. Matching 
 
b. Battle of the Sexes 
 
c. Stag Hunt 
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Figure 4: Predicted Outcomes for Risk, Trust and Position Interactions 
 
1. Matching Game 
a. Trust b. Risk 
  
2. Battle of the Sexes 
a. Trust b. Risk 
  
3. Stag Hunt 
a. Trust b. Risk 
  
Matching BoS Stag Hunt
b/se b/se b/se
Member 0.191 -0.216 0.0878
(0.34) (0.22) (0.39)
Leader -0.0529 -0.872*** 0.449
(0.48) (0.32) (0.44)
Trust 0.363 -5.801*** 8.124***
(1.79) (1.15) (1.57)
TrustxMember -1.179* 0.639 1.265*
(0.63) (0.41) (0.76)
LeaderxTrust -0.294 1.573*** 1.305
(0.90) (0.59) (0.88)
Alter Trust -0.572 -5.337*** 8.403***
(1.91) (1.03) (1.75)
Egoxalter Trust -0.313 8.947*** -16.50***
(3.73) (2.08) (3.15)
Risk -0.14 -0.0283 0.511*
(0.26) (0.18) (0.29)
RiskxMember -0.0288 -0.515*** -0.646**
(0.22) (0.13) (0.26)
LeaderxRisk 0.27 -0.506** -0.743**
(0.32) (0.23) (0.35)
Alter Risk -0.104 -0.123 -0.513**
(0.19) (0.15) (0.25)
EgoxAlter Risk -0.0836 0.239 1.350***
(0.30) (0.23) (0.35)
rho 0.0696** 0.163*** 0.621***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
N 990 1980 3168
log likelihood -882.19109 -3329.34 -1089.68
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (two-tailed)
Table 1: The Impact of Position, Trust, and Risk on Coordination
Position
Trust
Risk
Matching BoS Stag Hunt
b/se b/se b/se
age -0.0201 -0.0371* 0.00684
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
male 0.07 0.132 0.419***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Closed first 0.166 -0.192* 0.0501
(0.11) (0.11) (0.17)
Match First -0.217 0.138 0.127
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20)
Stag Hunt First -0.283** 0.012 -0.456***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16)
Experts -0.0187 -0.425* 0.875***
(0.25) (0.23) (0.33)
Round2 -- -- 0.569***
(0.11)
Round3 -- -- 0.645***
(0.11)
Round4 -- -- 0.970***
(0.12)
cut1 -1.819* -5.311*** 1.842**
(1.01) (0.69) (0.83)
cut2 -1.34 -4.895*** 2.145***
(1.01) (0.69) (0.83)
cut3 -- -4.556*** 2.550***
(0.69) (0.83)
cut4 -- -3.967*** 2.938***
(0.69) (0.83)
cut5 -- -3.415*** 3.192***
(0.69) (0.84)
N 990 1980 3168
log likelihood -882.19109 -3329.34 -1089.68
*p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 (two-tailed)
Table 1(ctd): The Impact of Position, Trust, and Risk on Coordination
Controls
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Table 2: Implications for Leaders, Followers and Members 
 
 
Implications for Trust 
Coordination 
situation  Matching 
Battle of the 
Sexes 
Stag Hunt 
Leader 
Reduce trust, seek low 
trust alter 
 
Increase trust, seek 
similar alter 
Increase trust, seek 
opposite alter 
Follower 
move opposite alter, seek 
low trust alter 
 
Move toward alter, 
seek similar alter 
Move opposite alter, seek 
opposite alter 
Member 
Reduce trust, Seek 
opposite alter 
 
Move toward alter, 
seek similar alter 
Move opposite alter, seek 
opposite alter 
 
 
Implications for Risk Aversion 
Coordination 
situation  Matching 
Battle of the 
Sexes 
Stag Hunt 
Leader 
Increase aversion, seek 
low aversion alters 
Decrease aversion, 
seek similar alter 
Increase aversion (little 
effect), alter doesn’t 
matter 
Follower 
Reduce aversion, Choose 
low aversion alter 
 
Move toward alter, 
seek similar alter 
Increase aversion, seek 
similar alter 
Member 
Reduce aversion, seek 
opposite alter 
 
Reduce aversion, seek 
similar alter 
Move toward alter, seek 
similar alter 
 
